[Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira] EBOOK NEW

  • Hardcover
  • 482
  • Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira
  • Thomas E. Ricks
  • English
  • 01 July 2020
  • 9781594201035

Thomas E. Ricks ↠ 2 Review

Free download Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Free read ´ Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Ë PDF, DOC, TXT, eBook or Kindle ePUB free Has never been told before is that of a Military occupation whose leaders failed to see a blooming insurge. Retrospective on another important book published some years ago on Ira How has the work held upThomas Ricks book Fiasco was part of an increasing body of literature featuring and books based on the words and experiences of insiders government and military officials talking after the fact raising uestions about the wisdom of the original decision to invade Ira and the occupation and nation building efforts thereafter This work and others as well raises important uestions about the extent to which the American effort to create democratic nation building in Ira was doomed from the start Any number of books and articles in the subject of what it takes to create democracy and what it takes to engineer democracies speak to a project that had a low chance of success from the get go And given the strategic and tactical errors of the United States those originally low odds of success became lower still So Fiasco is one among several works that raised serious uestions about the outcome of the American experiment in democratic nation building in Ira Ricks book is useful in this context to this point it is one of the best efforts at getting insights and accounts from insiders Again we need to be somewhat cautious about the many sources who spoke with the author Some have axes to grind others are not necessarily the most credible sources Nonetheless this work in combination with others that have appeared raises interesting and important uestions and is an important work to explore Ira as of early 2011 appears to be wobbly but it has become a independent state and the mechanisms of government created over the past several years creak along We probably need a bit time to see how things end up but many of the negative analyses such as Ricks may well have been too negative Again though we need to see how history works itself out

Free download Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira

Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira

Free download Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Free read ´ Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Ë PDF, DOC, TXT, eBook or Kindle ePUB free Ncy for what it was and as a result lead their soldiers in such a way that the insurgency became inevitable. I ve always enjoyed Thomas Ricks reporting in WaPo WSJ etc as well as his earlier book Making the Corps What I appreciated most about Fiasco was its crisp prose and simple level headedness In that Fiasco confirmed a belief that I have slowly been coming to that even after we invaded Ira it still really might have been ok not good necessarily but ok But we blew opportunity after opportunity to do the right thing and it really is unredeemable now The thing that weirds me out the most though Realizing how much of this basic narrative was available to me while I was neck deep in grad school Granted I was a military history freak in jr high and high school and still read the news avidly even during seminary But if I could spot so many of our military and policy missteps as an overworked theology student what the hell was our White House and DOD doing Wasn t it their job to pay attention How bad was their information stream anyway Or were they really that arrogantly impervious to uncomfortable truths Depressing but enlightening

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Free download Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Free read ´ Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira Ë PDF, DOC, TXT, eBook or Kindle ePUB free This is the Story of The American Military Adventure in Ira The Heart of the story Fiasco has to tell which. The failure of the 1991 Gulf War to take out Saddam Hussein left a small contingent of hawks looking for redress Most notable among these was then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz who reported to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney As a policy of containment took hold Wolfowitz complained for action against Saddam but in the Bush 41 administration he did not find a receptive ear from Cheney Wolfowitz s disdain for containment may have been due to the loss of most of his Polish extended family in the holocaust Wolfowitz compared Saddam to Hitler and his security forces to the Gestapo Another advocate for action was Donald Rumsfeld who along with Wolfowitz and John Bolton belonged to an advocacy group that issued a letter to President Clinton in 1998 demanding regime change in Ira Even though in the 2000 presidential election Bush and Cheney doubled down on a non interventionist policy Bush made Donald Rumsfeld Defense Secretary and Wolfowitz Deputy Defense Secretary Initially however Wolfowitz s only strong interventionist ally in the Bush administration was Scooter Libby Cheney s chief of staff911 changed everything Rumsfeld became disillusioned with the intelligence community and again sided with Wolfowitz Then the New York Times chimed in with reporting by Pulitzer Prize winning columnist Judith Miller claiming Ira had a WMD program housed in multiple hidden sites None of it was true but it had a big impact Bush made sure everyone knew that his administration s attitude had changed in his 2002 state of the union speech when he declared Ira along with North Korea and Iran to be an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the worldtime is not on our side I will not wait on events while dangers gather Cheney reiterated in August 2002 saying We must take the battle to the enemy claiming There is no doubt Ira has WMD This would be proven false and to have been based on cherry picked bits of intelligence selected to prove what the hardliners already believed Cheney radically changed after 911 perhaps from fear of a repetition but also perhaps because he was suffering from serious heart problems The hardliners reinforced each other and Cheney in particular intimidated the intelligence community Cheney s pressure culminated in CIA Director George Tenet releasing a made to order National Intelligence Estimate summary supporting the WMD case that heavily influenced President Bush The detailed report was far less clear than the summary In September 2002 NY Times columnist Judith Miller struck again this time on page one writing that Saddam Hussein was actively searching for A bomb parts later proven false By the fall of 2002 with the decision to go to war made and Congress offering no serious opposition Rumsfeld began planning Unlike Cheney in the Gulf War Rumsfeld overrode his military scaling back reuired force estimates particularly for the aftermath Calling it planning is really a misnomer Inexperienced civilian hardliners put together PowerPoints on what to expect Input from experienced people in the State Department or military was largely ignored Those that objected such as knowledgeable former generals Shinseki and Zinni were vilified The official line was that the troops would be welcomed as liberators uickly turn the government back over to the Irais and leave It was all politically generated and na ve In February 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell with Tenet sitting behind him gave a speech at the UN offering evidence of Irai WMD This abysmal low point in his career came about because he accepted the CIA summary and unverified input from the administration all of which was crafted to support a decision already made The US attacked in March 2003 Taking Baghdad proceeded pretty much as planned Little else did The Irai troops didn t defect in mass and support the Americans as the administration had predicted Once defeated most waited to see what the Americans would do Some melted into the civilian population and began organizing resistance starting by stocking up on arms that Saddam had stashed around the country General Franks did not take responsibility for what followed in Ira after his victory in taking Baghdad The US had no plan to administer Ira after Saddam s fall US forces didn t secure the borders seize Saddam s arm stashes or maintain order Chaos ensued with widespread looting and vandalism American troops never expected to be an occupation force for which they were severely undermanned Some were busy hunting for WMDs that didn t exist Others were getting ready to go home as they had been promised Irais figured Americans didn t care or simply were incapable of taking control They soon lost any faith they may have had in their liberators Meanwhile on May 1 2003 Bush was uick to claim victory flying in a combat jet onto the deck of an aircraft carrier over which a banner claimed mission accomplished In May 2003 as the situation in Ira continued to deteriorate Paul Bremer was appointed to head the Coalition Provisional Authority He technically reported to Rumsfeld but Rumsfeld thought he reported to the White House National Security Council It didn t matter because Bremer did what he wanted General Franks was replaced by General Sanchez who reported to Central Command in Tampa which reported to Rumsfeld No single person in Ira was in charge and Bremer and Sanchez could barely stand each other Bremer wasted no time disenfranchising Irais First he fired all senior Baathist party members from government run organizations That put 85000 people who knew how to operate the country s infrastructure on the street without jobs Next he dissolved the Irai Army putting 385000 men on the streets with no income and plenty of time to express their resentment Then he let go the 285000 working for the Interior Ministry which included police and security forces The US Army had not been notified in advance of these decisions Even Rumsfeld didn t seem to know about these decisions Bremer s actions ensured the occupation would be a long one and proved to be an excellent way to get the Irai insurgency up and running Bombing and sniping increased and was widespread within a couple of months But back in Washington the Bush administration denied that there was a serious problem and still expressed confidence that that they would find WMD In July when asked about Irais attacking U S forces Bush said My answer is Bring em on A year later the Islamic Jihad Army replied Have you another challenge Bombings increased Particularly significant was the bomb laden truck that crashed into the UN mission in Ira in August 2003 killing twenty two and wounding seventy The blast broke windows a half mile away The UN reduced its presence to a token and ceased being the mediator between the US and Shiite leaders Other international organizations took note and began leaving The insurgency was being strategic cutting Americans off from constructive contact with Irais American forces were a hammer in search of a nail The US employed counterproductive conventional war tactics with ard vehicles patrolling through Irai neighborhoods mass roundups and imprisonments nighttime raids on personal residences humiliating men in front of their families physical and mental abuse of detainees all guaranteed to alienate everyday Irais As Irai animosity intensified the IED the low tech roadside bomb became the weapon of choice for the insurgents The IED was very effective It was responsible for one third of US troop deaths in the insurgency s first year and two thirds of casualties reuiring medical evacuation out of Ira IED attacks would steadily increase throughout 2004 The IED further isolated US troops who became very reluctant to venture out among the Irais except as ordered on combat style missions General Sanchez provided little central direction thus area commanders used varying tactics some particularly harsh and alienating but a few such as General Petraeus in the Irai north employed proven counterinsurgency measures to good effect Counterinsurgency calls for winning over the people by engaging with them and respecting them the opposite of what most US divisions were doingIn early October 2003 Bush still had the blinders on saying The situation is improving on a daily basis in Ira People are freer the security situation is getting better That month the Ramadan offensive got underway The insurgents sent a message to the US by launching rockets into the heavily protected American Green Zone Rockets struck the hotel where Wolfowitz was staying killing an Army officer on the floor below They also sent a message to Irais working with the Americans assassinating one of the Baghdad mayors Violence dramatically escalated to 45 attacks per day on American forces US helicopters were shot down 60 US troops were killed in two weeks All in all by November US troops had been killed from May to November 2003 than in the US invasion Rumsfeld and the Bush administration s plans still called for reducing US troop strength based on their belief that things were going well but now doubts crept in Finally Rumsfeld changed his tune saying publically We re in a low intensity war that needs to be won Even the capture of Saddam Hussain in December didn t help Many Irai s felt now they could join the resistance since they would no longer be fighting for SaddamThe US Army was given the unexpected role of administering Irai prisons including tens of thousands of detainees collected in the growing number of cordon and sweep operations While targeting known insurgents many innocent suspects were routinely detained in the sweeps and sent off to prison Abu Ghraib the main prison was overwhelmed Prisoners waited weeks and months to be interrogated Many were simply lost in the system The reserve MP troops running the prison were not properly trained or supervised and abuse was prevalent not that abuse was confined to the prisons Individual field divisions varied widely in their treatment of detained Irais Detainees were freuently subject to violence and humiliation before entering prison Ricks spends many pages describing the myriad ways prisoners were mistreated injured and sometimes killed and much became public Then the news about abu Ghraib broke in April 2004 Americans Irais and people around the world were stunned Military leaders could claim they were unaware of much of the abuse in the field and prisons largely because many commanders had let it be known that they didn t want to hear about itAs 2004 unfolded the Irai insurgency hardened and spread Now the insurgents were better euipped and experienced But US forces rotated out after one year Their replacements had to learn all over again how war in Ira was fought It wasn t the war they were trained to fight The few good working relationships between Irai and US forces were lost A significant failure of those leaving was not properly training euipping and supporting Irai forces the US had recruited This was essential given the inability of Americans to understand and deal with people of a different culture and language Another failure that undercut attempts to implement counterinsurgency doctrine was not providing security for the majority of Irais who were not insurgents The average Irai was terrified by uncontrolled crime Kidnappings robberies and rapes were commonplace If the US couldn t protect them better to align with the insurgents Another failure was not getting basic services up and running What were Irais with no electricity to think when they saw the bright lights emanating from the green zoneIn March 2004 Fallujah exploded A group of Blackwater security contractors bypassed a marine checkpoint were ambushed dismembered hung from a bridge then burned to cheering crowds General Mattis and his Marines had taken over from the army in Fallujah just days earlier Mattis saw this as a ploy by the insurgents to draw them into a major battle Mattis who had trained his troops in counterinsurgency tactics wanted to wait then go after just the insurgents responsible to maintain relations with city residents He and his military bosses including Sanchez were overruled President Bush demanded major action immediately to offset the images on TV Without time to gather intelligence the marines went in clearing the city block by block in intense fighting The fighting spread to nearby Ramadi then Shiite militias attacked the south of Ira and in Shiite enclaves in Baghdad Sunni and Shiite attacks spread to other cities Attacks on convoys increased sharply Irai troops that Americans had recruited refused to fight other Irais In April President Bush inexplicably said Most of Fallujah is returning to normal Nothing could have been further from the truth The marines were forced by Bush to turn the city back over to those they had been fighting so he could claim victory The war strategy was being directed politically and ineptly from the White House Ira was on fire the insurgents were winning battles and the people fell in line At one US battalion H a sign read Dilbert of the Day The key to happiness is self delusion Ricks goes on to describe many other battles As 2004 rolled into summer both sides improved their tactics but the US still lacked a strategy to win or end the war echoing Viet Nam Special Forces were not being used effectively but given the debacle of conventional warfare in 2004 by 2005 they would be seen as the answer Special Forces were designed to engage in small scale precise actions designed to eliminate the enemy without alienating the people By 2005 two pillars of the rationale for invasion were laid to rest There were no WMD and no linkage between Saddam Hussain s regime and al aeda The third pillar of the rationale liberation also looked incredibly weak After abu Ghraib and the toll of destruction and death experienced by everyday Irais how could it be said they were better off The New York Times and other newspapers that had lent support to the war hawks changed their tune Congress chimed in and began criticizing the administration for the handling of the war The fallaciousness of Judith Miller s reporting was exposed and she left the Times in 2005 In mid 2004 Bremer and General Sanchez were replaced The new leadership began the transition to counterinsurgency tactics In November 2004 the second battle of Fallujah began This time with three times the number of troops months of planning and the use of Special Operations the marines took the city in fierce methodical block by block house to house combat Much of the fighting was at close uarters but the marines also fired four thousand artillery rounds and ten thousand mortar shells supplemented by ten tons of bombs dropped from the air Two thousand buildings in Fallujah were destroyed and ten thousand damaged The battle was important to show that the insurgents were not the inevitable winners but the destruction of Fallujah was hardly going to endear the residents to their liberators The death of residents was minimized since almost all left the city before the battle beganIn 2005 the insurgency became sophisticated and expanded The US began implementing new tactics that were anathema in 2003 This is where Ricks leaves us the book published in 2006 The takeaways are pretty obvious A politically driven disastrous war was entered into by an administration motivated by paranoid beliefs an administration that isolated itself ignoring experienced and knowledgeable input an administration that bought into any story that supported its preconceived notions an administration that could never admit it made mistakes an administration living in a delusion Ricks ends by exploring possible scenarios for the future of Ira He considers civil and regional war as possibilities Many of these scenarios and are still possible as our latest president know it all tinkers with forces he doesn t understand in the Middle East maintaining America s involvement in the Yemini Civil War and taunting Iran Reading how the Bush administration drove America to war in Ira sends a chill down my spine when I think about how our current president employs the same modus operandi Imagimorphia ear from Cheney Wolfowitz s disdain for containment may have been due to the loss of most of his Polish 午後の曳航 Gogo no eikō extended family in the holocaust Wolfowitz compared Saddam to Hitler and his security forces to the Gestapo Another advocate for action was Donald Rumsfeld who along with Wolfowitz and John Bolton belonged to an advocacy group that issued a letter to President Clinton in 1998 demanding regime change in Ira Even though in the 2000 presidential Everyone Worth Knowing election Bush and Cheney doubled down on a non interventionist policy Bush made Donald Rumsfeld Defense Secretary and Wolfowitz Deputy Defense Secretary Initially however Wolfowitz s only strong interventionist ally in the Bush administration was Scooter Libby Cheney s chief of staff911 changed ダンス・ダンス・ダンス Dansu dansu dansu everything Rumsfeld became disillusioned with the intelligence community and again sided with Wolfowitz Then the New York Times chimed in with reporting by Pulitzer Prize winning columnist Judith Miller claiming Ira had a WMD program housed in multiple hidden sites None of it was true but it had a big impact Bush made sure Die Dreigroschenoper everyone knew that his administration s attitude had changed in his 2002 state of the union speech when he declared Ira along with North Korea and Iran to be an axis of Cyrano de Bergerac evil arming to threaten the peace of the worldtime is not on our side I will not wait on Buda's Wagon A Brief History of the Car Bomb events while dangers gather Cheney reiterated in August 2002 saying We must take the battle to the China von innen gesehen enemy claiming There is no doubt Ira has WMD This would be proven false and to have been based on cherry picked bits of intelligence selected to prove what the hardliners already believed Cheney radically changed after 911 perhaps from fear of a repetition but also perhaps because he was suffering from serious heart problems The hardliners reinforced Mutiny on the Bounty each other and Cheney in particular intimidated the intelligence community Cheney s pressure culminated in CIA Director George Tenet releasing a made to order National Intelligence Estimate summary supporting the WMD case that heavily influenced President Bush The detailed report was far less clear than the summary In September 2002 NY Times columnist Judith Miller struck again this time on page one writing that Saddam Hussein was actively searching for A bomb parts later proven false By the fall of 2002 with the decision to go to war made and Congress offering no serious opposition Rumsfeld began planning Unlike Cheney in the Gulf War Rumsfeld overrode his military scaling back reuired force Murphy estimates particularly for the aftermath Calling it planning is really a misnomer Inexperienced civilian hardliners put together PowerPoints on what to En attendant Godot expect Input from General Knowledge Genius experienced people in the State Department or military was largely ignored Those that objected such as knowledgeable former generals Shinseki and Zinni were vilified The official line was that the troops would be welcomed as liberators uickly turn the government back over to the Irais and leave It was all politically generated and na ve In February 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell with Tenet sitting behind him gave a speech at the UN offering The Wonderful Wizard of Oz evidence of Irai WMD This abysmal low point in his career came about because he accepted the CIA summary and unverified input from the administration all of which was crafted to support a decision already made The US attacked in March 2003 Taking Baghdad proceeded pretty much as planned Little Nebraska Nightcrawlers American Chillers #15 else did The Irai troops didn t defect in mass and support the Americans as the administration had predicted Once defeated most waited to see what the Americans would do Some melted into the civilian population and began organizing resistance starting by stocking up on arms that Saddam had stashed around the country General Franks did not take responsibility for what followed in Ira after his victory in taking Baghdad The US had no plan to administer Ira after Saddam s fall US forces didn t secure the borders seize Saddam s arm stashes or maintain order Chaos Jakob der Lügner ensued with widespread looting and vandalism American troops never Every Little Thing expected to be an occupation force for which they were severely undermanned Some were busy hunting for WMDs that didn t The Matchmaker each other Bremer wasted no time disenfranchising Irais First he fired all senior Baathist party members from government run organizations That put 85000 people who knew how to operate the country s infrastructure on the street without jobs Next he dissolved the Irai Army putting 385000 men on the streets with no income and plenty of time to The Glamorous Double Life of Isabel Bookbinder express their resentment Then he let go the 285000 working for the Interior Ministry which included police and security forces The US Army had not been notified in advance of these decisions Even Rumsfeld didn t seem to know about these decisions Bremer s actions Sanctuary ensured the occupation would be a long one and proved to be an Adventures of Sindbad excellent way to get the Irai insurgency up and running Bombing and sniping increased and was widespread within a couple of months But back in Washington the Bush administration denied that there was a serious problem and still Patriots and Partisans expressed confidence that that they would find WMD In July when asked about Irais attacking U S forces Bush said My answer is Bring The Rhythm of Riddles em on A year later the Islamic Jihad Army replied Have you another challenge Bombings increased Particularly significant was the bomb laden truck that crashed into the UN mission in Ira in August 2003 killing twenty two and wounding seventy The blast broke windows a half mile away The UN reduced its presence to a token and ceased being the mediator between the US and Shiite leaders Other international organizations took note and began leaving The insurgency was being strategic cutting Americans off from constructive contact with Irais American forces were a hammer in search of a nail The US Bhava employed counterproductive conventional war tactics with ard vehicles patrolling through Irai neighborhoods mass roundups and imprisonments nighttime raids on personal residences humiliating men in front of their families physical and mental abuse of detainees all guaranteed to alienate A Nomad of the Time Streams A Scientific Romance everyday Irais As Irai animosity intensified the IED the low tech roadside bomb became the weapon of choice for the insurgents The IED was very What Makes Women Happy effective It was responsible for one third of US troop deaths in the insurgency s first year and two thirds of casualties reuiring medical The Burning Boys evacuation out of Ira IED attacks would steadily increase throughout 2004 The IED further isolated US troops who became very reluctant to venture out among the Irais Insomnia except as ordered on combat style missions General Sanchez provided little central direction thus area commanders used varying tactics some particularly harsh and alienating but a few such as General Petraeus in the Irai north Disuiet Heart A Thriller employed proven counterinsurgency measures to good Die unendliche Geschichte effect Counterinsurgency calls for winning over the people by Did the Earth Move? engaging with them and respecting them the opposite of what most US divisions were doingIn Von allem Anfang an early October 2003 Bush still had the blinders on saying The situation is improving on a daily basis in Ira People are freer the security situation is getting better That month the Ramadan offensive got underway The insurgents sent a message to the US by launching rockets into the heavily protected American Green Zone Rockets struck the hotel where Wolfowitz was staying killing an Army officer on the floor below They also sent a message to Irais working with the Americans assassinating one of the Baghdad mayors Violence dramatically The Unknown Bridesmaid escalated to 45 attacks per day on American forces US helicopters were shot down 60 US troops were killed in two weeks All in all by November US troops had been killed from May to November 2003 than in the US invasion Rumsfeld and the Bush administration s plans still called for reducing US troop strength based on their belief that things were going well but now doubts crept in Finally Rumsfeld changed his tune saying publically We re in a low intensity war that needs to be won Even the capture of Saddam Hussain in December didn t help Many Irai s felt now they could join the resistance since they would no longer be fighting for SaddamThe US Army was given the unexpected role of administering Irai prisons including tens of thousands of detainees collected in the growing number of cordon and sweep operations While targeting known insurgents many innocent suspects were routinely detained in the sweeps and sent off to prison Abu Ghraib the main prison was overwhelmed Prisoners waited weeks and months to be interrogated Many were simply lost in the system The reserve MP troops running the prison were not properly trained or supervised and abuse was prevalent not that abuse was confined to the prisons Individual field divisions varied widely in their treatment of detained Irais Detainees were freuently subject to violence and humiliation before Miss Mackenzie entering prison Ricks spends many pages describing the myriad ways prisoners were mistreated injured and sometimes killed and much became public Then the news about abu Ghraib broke in April 2004 Americans Irais and people around the world were stunned Military leaders could claim they were unaware of much of the abuse in the field and prisons largely because many commanders had let it be known that they didn t want to hear about itAs 2004 unfolded the Irai insurgency hardened and spread Now the insurgents were better Safe with Him Safe #2 euipped and The Divine Feminine The Biblical Imagery of God As Female euipping and supporting Irai forces the US had recruited This was Das Mondlexikon Vom richtigen Zeitpunkt essential given the inability of Americans to understand and deal with people of a different culture and language Another failure that undercut attempts to implement counterinsurgency doctrine was not providing security for the majority of Irais who were not insurgents The average Irai was terrified by uncontrolled crime Kidnappings robberies and rapes were commonplace If the US couldn t protect them better to align with the insurgents Another failure was not getting basic services up and running What were Irais with no Innocence Protected electricity to think when they saw the bright lights The Mammoth Book of Modern Ghost Stories emanating from the green zoneIn March 2004 Fallujah Der SeelenvogelUmarme mich geliebte Seele Sonderausgabe exploded A group of Blackwater security contractors bypassed a marine checkpoint were ambushed dismembered hung from a bridge then burned to cheering crowds General Mattis and his Marines had taken over from the army in Fallujah just days A Light in the Storm the Civil War Diary of Amelia Martin Dear America earlier Mattis saw this as a ploy by the insurgents to draw them into a major battle Mattis who had trained his troops in counterinsurgency tactics wanted to wait then go after just the insurgents responsible to maintain relations with city residents He and his military bosses including Sanchez were overruled President Bush demanded major action immediately to offset the images on TV Without time to gather intelligence the marines went in clearing the city block by block in intense fighting The fighting spread to nearby Ramadi then Shiite militias attacked the south of Ira and in Shiite Crystal Bone October Girls #1 enclaves in Baghdad Sunni and Shiite attacks spread to other cities Attacks on convoys increased sharply Irai troops that Americans had recruited refused to fight other Irais In April President Bush inexplicably said Most of Fallujah is returning to normal Nothing could have been further from the truth The marines were forced by Bush to turn the city back over to those they had been fighting so he could claim victory The war strategy was being directed politically and ineptly from the White House Ira was on fire the insurgents were winning battles and the people fell in line At one US battalion H a sign read Dilbert of the Day The key to happiness is self delusion Ricks goes on to describe many other battles As 2004 rolled into summer both sides improved their tactics but the US still lacked a strategy to win or Justine ou Les Malheurs de la vertu end the war True Betrayals echoing Viet Nam Special Forces were not being used The Girl Who Kicked the Hornets Nest by Stieg Larsson | Summary Study Guide effectively but given the debacle of conventional warfare in 2004 by 2005 they would be seen as the answer Special Forces were designed to The Europeans A Sketch eliminate the Οἰδίπους Τύραννος enemy without alienating the people By 2005 two pillars of the rationale for invasion were laid to rest There were no WMD and no linkage between Saddam Hussain s regime and al aeda The third pillar of the rationale liberation also looked incredibly weak After abu Ghraib and the toll of destruction and death The Lost Colony experienced by Crenshaw exposed and she left the Times in 2005 In mid 2004 Bremer and General Sanchez were replaced The new leadership began the transition to counterinsurgency tactics In November 2004 the second battle of Fallujah began This time with three times the number of troops months of planning and the use of Special Operations the marines took the city in fierce methodical block by block house to house combat Much of the fighting was at close uarters but the marines also fired four thousand artillery rounds and ten thousand mortar shells supplemented by ten tons of bombs dropped from the air Two thousand buildings in Fallujah were destroyed and ten thousand damaged The battle was important to show that the insurgents were not the inevitable winners but the destruction of Fallujah was hardly going to Tiger Tiger entered into by an administration motivated by paranoid beliefs an administration that isolated itself ignoring Above It All Eureka Colorado #4 experienced and knowledgeable input an administration that bought into any story that supported its preconceived notions an administration that could never admit it made mistakes an administration living in a delusion Ricks Nicholas Nickleby ends by Scandal exploring possible scenarios for the future of Ira He considers civil and regional war as possibilities Many of these scenarios and are still possible as our latest president know it all tinkers with forces he doesn t understand in the Middle East maintaining America s involvement in the Yemini Civil War and taunting Iran Reading how the Bush administration drove America to war in Ira sends a chill down my spine when I think about how our current president Murder in Containment New Scotland YardDoyle and Acton #4 employs the same modus operandi